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Is there any reason why the American people
should be taxed to guarantee the debts of banks,
any more than they should be taxed to guaran-
tee the debts of other institutions, including the
merchants, the industries, and the mills of the
country?
Senator Carter Glass (1933)
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Introduction
The Federal Reserve Banks' discount window
advances to failing depository institutions have
become an increasingly controversial issue with-
in the last 20 years or so. This debate culminated
in congressionally mandated limitations on Re-
serve Banks' advances to undercapitalized
banks in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA), pre-
viously the subject of a Federal Reserve Bank
of Cleveland Economic Commentary.
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In a comparatively little-noticed amendment
of the Reserve Banks' lending authority, FDICIA
made potentially significant revisions to the
emergency liquidity provisions of the Federal
Reserve Act. In particular, the Act now permits
all nonbank firms — financial or otherwise
(called "nonbanks" here for simplicity) — to
borrow at the discount window for emergency
purposes under the same collateral terms
afforded to banks. Ironically, while the princi-
pal thrust of FDICIA was to limit or reduce the
size and scope of the federal financial safety
net, at least as applied to insured depository in-
stitutions, this provision effectively expanded
the safety net. This article describes the histori-
cal and theoretical backgrounds of the Reserve
Banks' emergency lending authority for non-
banks and analyzes the changes made by
FDICIA that affect that authority.
• 1 See Smith and Beasley (1972), p. 357. Senator Glass offered
these remarks during the Senate debate on the Banking Act of June 20,
1933 (Glass—Steagal! Act), which established, among other things, the
first plan of federal deposit insurance.
• 2 See Todd (1992a). FDICIA is Public Law No. 102-242 (Decem-
ber 19,1991). The provisions of FDICIA principally affecting Reserve
Banks' discount window operations are Sections 131-133 (prompt cor-
rective action) and Sections 141-142 (least-cost resolutions, systemic-
risk exceptions, and lending limitations). On prompt corrective action,
see Pike and Thomson (1992); on systemic risk, see Wall (1993); on




Since the creation of the first central banks in
Western Europe in the seventeenth century,
parliaments have often asked them to rescue
enterprises sponsored by the state or sover-
eign, favored private-sector enterprises, and
even, occasionally, the state itself.
3 In the
United States, Congress understood quite early
that it should avoid the expediency of direct
funding of the Treasury by borrowings from
the central bank.
4 This maxim of fiscal propri-
ety ("central banks should not undertake fiscal
activities") also makes theoretical sense and
has been explained as follows regarding the
central banks of developing countries:
Fiscal activities [such as implementing
selective credit policies or recapitalizing insol-
vent financial institutions] involve expenditures
that reduce central bank profits and may even
produce losses. If central bank losses are not
met from government budget appropriations,
they must eventually lead to an expansion in
central bank money and the abandonment of
any monetary policy goal of price stability.
5
Fiscal and monetary authorities in the United
States generally followed this view of the divi-
sion of their responsibilities during peacetime
from 1791 until sometime during 1931-33-
The extension of governmental credit di-
rectly to nonbank enterprises historically has
been a fiscal operation in the United States,
not a monetary policy operation of the type or-
dinarily undertaken by a central bank.
7 For ex-
ample, the original Federal Reserve Act of 1913
provided for the extension of Reserve Banks'
credit directly to member banks, but did not
allow for such credit to or for the account of
the Treasury, nonmember banks, or nonbanks.
• 3 See, for example, Fry (1993), Bordo (1992), Todd (1988), and
Humphrey and Keleher (1984).
• 4 Our Founding Fathers were well aware of the problems created by
Treasury borrowings from central banks. Alexander Hamilton, the first Secre-
tary of the Treasury, recommended, and Congress later passed, a bill provid-
ing that the First Bank of the United States, our first central bank, should be
prohibited from lending more than $50,000 to the Treasury or to any state or
foreign prince without the prior, explicit consent of Congress. When the Sec-
ond Bank of the United States was chartered in 1816, this limit was raised to
$500,000. See Hamilton (1967), pp. 31-32,34.
• 5 See Fry (1993).
Borrowing by member banks was governed by
the applicable sections of the Federal Reserve
Act (originally, Section 13), and borrowing by
other entities simply was not permitted. The
Federal Reserve Act was enacted in an era in
which peacetime federal budgets regularly
were in surplus, and it apparently was intended
that the Reserve Banks' money-creating powers
should not be substituted for explicit congres-
sional decisions on the Treasury's funding.
During the presidential election year of 1932,
economic pressures generated by the Great De-
pression caused President Herbert Hoover to
propose changing the previously indirect credit
relationship between Reserve Banks and non-
banks (the Reserve Banks could lend to banks,
but only banks could lend to nonbanks) to a
more direct one. Although he had vetoed a
prior version of the Emergency Relief and Con-
struction Act that summer because it would
have authorized the former Reconstruction Fi-
nance Corporation (RFC) to make loans di-
rectly to individuals,
8 Hoover allowed Section
13 (3) to be added to the Federal Reserve Act
as part of a road construction measure de-
signed to relieve unemployment. Subject to cer-
tain restrictions, Section 13 (3) authorized
Reserve Banks, "in unusual and exigent circum-
stances," to extend credit directly to "individu-
als, partnerships, and corporations."
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Section 13 (3) proved to be so restricted that it
did not open the floodgates of Reserve Banks'
• 6 See Todd (1993b). Beginning in early October 1931, President
Hoover proposed that the Reserve Banks expand their lending authority
to include the rescue of insolvent banks during peacetime, but the princi-
pal proposals for use of the Reserve Banks' lending authority for fiscal
purposes were not enacted until the early months of the New Deal, after
March 4,1933. The most noteworthy of those proposals was the Thomas
Amendment to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of May 12,1933, revised
on May 27,1933, and on many subsequent occasions, added as Sec-
tions 14 (b)(3) and 14 (h) of the Federal Reserve Act (expired in 1981).
See Moley (1966), pp. 300-03; and Hoover (1952), pp. 395-99.
• 7 See Todd (1992b) and Martin (1957), pp. 768-69.
• 8 On the RFC, see generally Todd (1992b), Keeton (1992), and
Olson (1988). Strange as it may seem to modern readers, banks' lending
to individuals (as opposed to farmers or business associations) before
1933 was commonly regarded as either a kind of speculation more appro-
priate for investment bankers than for commercial bankers or a charitable
act more appropriate for mutual savings banks or benevolent societies
than for commercial banks. For a colorful account of this phenomenon,
see Grant (1992), pp. 76-95,267-68.
• 9 The text of the Emergency Relief and Construction Act of July 21,
1932, Public Law No. 72-302, is found in Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol.
18 (August 1932), pp. 520-27. Section 210 of that Act [Section 13 (3)] is
at p. 523. The Board's circular authorizing emergency discounts under
Section 13 (3) for six months beginning August 1,1932, is at ibid., pp.
518-20.liquidity to the general public in 1932. At least
five members of the Board of Governors (the
"Board," which then included six regularly ap-
pointed and two ex officio members) had to
vote affirmatively to find that "unusual and exi-
gent circumstances" warranting implementa-
tion of Section 13 (3) existed. The collateral
offered by borrowers had to consist of "real
bills" and certain Treasury obligations "of the
kinds and maturities made eligible for discount
for member banks under other provisions of
[the Federal Reserve] Act."
1
0 In essence, the
only acceptable collateral would have been
near substitutes for cash. The final statutory re-
striction required the Reserve Banks to find evi-
dence that the borrower was unable to "secure




These restrictions made it unlikely that many
nonbanks could qualify for emergency advances
from Reserve Banks. In fact, due to these restric-
tions and the availability of credit elsewhere,
1
2
the Reserve Banks "made loans to only 123 busi-
ness enterprises [from 1932 until 1936] aggregat-
ing only about $1.5 million [under Section 13
(3)]. The largest single loan was for $3OO,OOO."
1
3
In 1935, the Board requested, and Congress
approved, an amendment of Section 13 (3) in-
tended to make nonbanks' borrowing somewhat
easier. Despite that statutory change, no such
loans actually have been made since the amend-
ment became effective in 1936.
1
4 Prior to the
1935 amendment, a borrower had to satisfy two
relevant conditions: a satisfactory endorsement
• 10 Real bills, for the purposes discussed here, are "notes, drafts, and
bills of exchange arising out of actual commercial transactions," with remain-
ing maturities of not more than 90 days [therefore, self-liquidating], "issued
or drawn for agricultural, industrial, or commercial purposes, or the pro-
ceeds of which have been used, or are to be used, for such purposes," as
distinguished from "speculative," investment, or working-capital pur-
poses. See Section 13 (2) of the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. Section
343) and Hackley (1973), pp. 37 and 129.
• 11 See Hackley (1973), pp. 127-28. Under another provision of
the Federal Reserve Act, Section 13 (13)(12 U.S.C. Section 347c), added
in 1933, nonbanks may borrow directly from Reserve Banks without a
finding of financial emergency ("unusual and exigent circumstances") by
the Board, but only on the security of the U.S. government or (since
1968) U.S. government agency obligations.
• 12 In particular, after 1934, the Federal Reserve was authorized to
mount a rival program to extend credit directly to individuals, partnerships,
and corporations "for working capital purposes" under former Section 13b
of the Federal Reserve Act (expired in 1958). However, the operations of the
RFC expanded greatly after 1933 and displaced the direct credit extension
role earlier foreseen for the Reserve Banks under Sections 13 (3), 13b, and
13 (13). Regarding former Section 13b, see discussions in Schwartz (1992),
pp. 61-62, and Hackley (1973), pp. 133-^5.
• 13 Hackley (1973), p. 130.
(by either the borrower or a third-party surety)
on the borrower's own note pledged to the Re-
serve Bank, and security (eligible collateral) for
the borrower's discounted note or notes. After
the 1935 amendment, either an endorsement or
additional security for such notes was required.
This change made it easier for a borrower to dis-
count his own note.
After 1935, however, borrowers had a clear
choice between the distinct concepts of eligi-
ble collateral (what security could be pledged
to secure the Reserve Bank's advance) and eli-
gible purpose (the use to which the Reserve
Bank's advance would be put). That is, non-
banks could borrow for any purpose as long
as they pledged eligible collateral. Failing that,
they could borrow on their own notes against
any satisfactory collateral, including ineligible
collateral, as long as they had eligible purposes
for their borrowings.
Securities firms, mutual funds, and insurance
companies, the greater part of whose asset
portfolios included ineligible collateral, could not
be said to have eligible purposes for borrowing
to fund those particular assets. The payment of
an ordinary business firm's general operating
expenses could qualify as an eligible purpose
for borrowing from a Reserve Bank, but eligi-
ble expenses normally included such things as
the payment of utility bills, regular taxes, pay-
roll, and the purchase of raw materials. Activi-
ties deemed speculative, such as the purchase
of a portfolio of common stocks or investment
securities generally (other than government se-
curities), or the financing of permanent fixed
investments with instruments maturing in more
than 90 days, were ineligible purposes.
1
5 As
the principal historian of the subject explained
this point,
• 14 The Board has reactivated Section 13 (3) rarely since the 1930s,
but this emergency lending authority has not actually been used since 1936.
It was activated for savings and loan associations, mutual savings banks,
and nonmember commercial banks in 1966 and 1969 (Hackley [1973], p.
130). Its use also was contemplated for assistance to New York City (said to
be a "municipal corporation") in 1975. The potential use of Section 13 (3)
for depository institutions became unnecessary when the Monetary Control
Act of 1980 added Section 19 (b)(7) to the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C.
Section 461) to authorize routine advances of Reserve Banks' credit to "any
depository institution in which transaction accounts or nonpersonai time de-
posits are held." Such routine advances are secured by any satisfactory as-
sets (not limited to eligible collateral) and are available at nonpenalty rates,
even for nonmember depository institutions. Thus, there has been no need
for emergency discounts for those institutions that could be secured only by
collateral that was a near substitute for cash.
• 15 See generally Hackley (1973), pp. 34-38. At p. 129, he dis-
cusses the use of a borrower's own note under Section 13 (3).fflhe reason why the Reserve Banks were
prohibited from extending credit on stocks
and bonds [under Section 131 was that the [Re-
serve] Banks were intended to assist commer-
cial banking and not investment banking.
Paper eligible for discount was confined to
self-liquidating paper arising out of commer-
cial rather than investment transactions.
While securities firms and other nonbank fi-
nancial firms could borrow for the eligible pur-
pose of funding the types of current operating
expenses described above, their liabilities for
such expenses normally would constitute only
a small fraction of their balance sheets. In con-
trast, their loans to carry customers' accounts
invested in securities (other than government
securities) are ineligible purposes but poten-
tially require much greater funding than the
proportion of their assets related to eligible pur-
poses. It apparently was the intent of Congress
to remove these ineligible collateral/ineligible
purpose restrictions on nonbanks' borrowings
from Reserve Banks that underlay the 1991
amendment of Section 13 (3).
II. Amendments
of Section 13 (3)
in FDICIA
Section 13 (3) has been discussed very little
since the 1930s, so it might seem unusual to
find Section 473, amending Section 13 (3), in-
serted in the final stages of the congressional
deliberations on FDICIA in November 1991.
Increasingly, however, since the stock market
crash of October 1987, some policymakers had
been discussing the potential use of the Re-
serve Banks' discount windows to relieve non-
bank financial firms' liquidity crises directly.
Procedurally, there were enough obstacles to
such use of the discount window to discour-
age financial firms from relying on Section 13
(3) to rescue them in a liquidity crisis: The pro-
cedural starting point always was an emer-
gency declaration approved by at least five
members of the Board. Also, the practical ob-
stacles appeared insurmountable: For borrow-
ings secured by eligible collateral, nonbank
financial firms typically held comparatively few
unpledged assets that would qualify, and bor-
• 16 Hackley (1973), p. 38. Depository institutions may, however,
obtain extensions of Reserve Bank credit under Section 10B (12 U.S.C.
Section 347b) even on ineligible stock or bond collateral ("any satisfac-
tory assets"), but the amounts available might be limited under Section
11 (m)(12 U.S.C. Section 248 [m]), added in 1916.
rowings said to be for eligible purposes typi-
cally would be quite limited.
Another issue that was not, but probably
should have been, raised explicitly during con-
gressional deliberations on FDICIA was that any
consideration of altering the Reserve Banks' col-
lateral or purpose of borrowing standards to ac-
commodate nonbanks' asset portfolios under
Section 13 (3) clearly would shift a portion of the
risk of loss previously borne by the nonbanks'
creditors onto the Reserve Banks and, thus, indi-
rectly onto the taxpayer.
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7 One of the poten-
tially troublesome aspects of the FDICIA
amendment of Section 13 (3) is that it appears
to reflect a motive or spirit that contradicts that
of the FDICIA provisions intended both to
limit Reserve Banks' loans to undercapitalized
depository institutions and to make it more dif-
ficult for the Federal Reserve to treat an institu-
tion as too big to fail. If the amendment was
intended to provide a vehicle for possible Fed-
eral Reserve treatment of a failing securities
firm as too big to fail, then it arguably consti-
tutes a contradictory extension of the same fed-
eral safety net that was retrenched in other
parts of FDICIA and apparently enlarges the
moral hazard problem of deposit insurance.
Of the issues just identified regarding the
amendment of Section 13 (3), only restrictions
based on the types of collateral that nonbank
borrowers could offer were discussed explicitly
during the congressional deliberations on FDICIA
in 1991. It appears that, having satisfied itself that
the risks from expanding the collateral limits
were minimal and that it might prove helpful to
provide the Reserve Banks with this additional,
liquidity-maximizing policy tool for a financial
emergency, Congress adopted the revisions of
Section 13 (3) as Section 473 of FDICIA without
extensive discussion or debate, leaving a rather
sketchy legislative history for this statute. How-
ever, by altering the collateral standards explic-
itly, FDICIA implicitly rendered Section 13 (3)'s
purpose of borrowing restrictions largely super-
fluous because the prior standards for eligible
purposes were binding only on nonbanks that
could not pledge eligible collateral.
• 17 The Reserve Banks'operations create an indirect gain or loss
for the taxpayer because the operating profits are rebated to the Treasury
as a miscellaneous receipt offsetting part of the federal government's op-
erating expenses. In tiscal year 1992, those receipts were $27.1 billion, of
which the Reserve Banks contributed $22.9 billion (Council of Economic
Advisers [1993], p. 437). Losses incurred on Reserve Banks' operations
would reduce those receipts. While material losses for Reserve Banks
have been rare since World War II, they are not inconceivable for central
banks that attempt to subsidize fiscal operations on their balance sheets.
See Fry (1993).The actual statutory language change made by
Section 473 of FDICIA was comparatively minor.
The restrictive phrase in quotation marks below
was deleted from the part of Section 13 (3) that
described the collateral acceptable for emergency
discounts for nonbanks. Prior to the change, a
Federal Reserve Bank could discount for any in-
dividual, partnership, or corporation any notes,
drafts, and bills of exchange when these instru-
ments were endorsed or otherwise secured to the
satisfaction of the Reserve Bank and, when en-
dorsed, were "of the kinds and maturities made eli-
gible for discount for member banks under other
provisions of this Act ...."It generally was under-
stood that this reference was primarily to the types
of financial instruments meeting the eligible pur-
pose standards as illustrated in Section 13 (2), but
also included instruments described in other parts
of Sections 13 and 14 of the Federal Reserve Act.
Since FDICIA, Reserve Banks' emergency ad-
vances to nonbanks may be based on the
types of collateral acceptable for depository in-
stitutions under an entirely different provision
of the Federal Reserve Act, Section 10B, which
permits "advances ... secured to the satisfaction
of ... [the] Federal Reserve Bank," or "any satis-
factory assets."
1
8 Because nonbanks' emer-
gency borrowings need not be secured by
eligible collateral, eligibility of purpose of bor-
rowing has become moot. The only collateral
test remaining under revised Section 13 (3) is
"satisfactory security," the same test that ap-





The changes made by FDICIA expanded emer-
gency discount window access for nonbanks of
all types, not merely securities firms, because any
satisfactory assets (not just marketable securities,
for example) may be pledged to secure the bor-
rower's own note. Whether these changes will
have practical consequences is an open question.
After all, Section 13 (3) is an emergency lending
provision that has been and presumably will con-
tinue to be invoked very rarely and that requires
the affirmative vote of five Federal Reserve Board
governors. It is important to keep in mind that
nonbanks' behavior depends in part on how they
expect the Federal Reserve to manage its emer-
gency lending powers.
The few, scattered public statements regarding
congressional intent with respect to Section 473
of FDICIA do indicate that the intended benefi-
ciaries were securities firms, and no other type of
nonbank was mentioned explicitly.
1
9 Although a
brief reference was made during the FDICIA delib-
erations to the absence of any discounts under Sec-
tion 13 (3) since 1936, the potentially increased
taxpayer risk from alteration of the collateral and
purpose standards was not discussed.
2
0
How could a new element of taxpayer risk
arise? One possible source is derived from the
moral hazard aspects of the increased availa-
bility of Reserve Banks' loans to nonbanks dur-
ing financial emergencies. Nonbanks lacking
eligible collateral or eligible purposes for bor-
rowing must manage their affairs and conduct
their relations with creditors and clients so as
to be able to survive financial market emergen-
cies. Now, with increased potential for assis-
tance during emergencies, nonbanks' managers
might have less incentive to avoid recourse to
the Federal Reserve. Although nonbanks still
have strong incentives to run their firms pru-
dently, their managers now have potential ac-
cess to another funding source during financial
crises. Whether this potential access alters non-
banks' business decisions — so as to make
their calling upon that funding source more
likely — remains to be seen.
More troubling, however, are the macro im-
plications of these incentive changes. The ex-
tension of the federal financial safety net to
nonbanks may increase the probability of mar-
ket liquidity crises that appear to require Fed-
eral Reserve emergency lending. This could
happen during periods of market stress if the
costs of risky investment and funding strategies
are not fully borne by the managers and share-
holders of nonbank firms, but instead are per-
ceived as being partially or fully underwritten
• 19 During the floor debate in the Senate on the version of FDICIA
that was enacted, Senator Christopher Dodd of Connecticut spoke as fol-
lows in support of the bill:
It [FDICIA] also includes a provision I offered to give the Federal Re-
serve greater flexibility to respond in instances in which the overall
financial system threatens to collapse. My provision allows the Fed
more power to provide liquidity, by enabling it to make fully secured
loans to securities firms in instances similar to the 1987 stock mar-
ket crash.
See Congressional Record (1991), p. S18619. For similar legal interpre-
tations of Section 473 of FDICIA, see FDICIA (1992), pp. 37 and 92. See
also Holland (1991).
18 See Hackley (1973), pp. 109-12, and Eccles (1951), pp. 171-73.
• 20 See U.S. Senate Report No. 102-167 (October 1,1991),
pp. 202-03.by U.S. taxpayers.
2
1 Self-correcting market
forces that help to insulate financial markets
from macroeconomic shocks could be eroded
by what nonbanks regard as implicit taxpayer
guarantees of nonbank losses and, thereby, in-
crease the probability that a real-sector shock
would become translated into a financial crisis.
A certain amount of adverse selection also
might compound the Federal Reserve's difficul-
ties: It becomes increasingly likely that better-
capitalized firms would remain outside the
Reserve Banks' lending net (in order to avoid
the perceived stigma of borrowing). It also is
likely that only the worst-capitalized firms
could not raise adequate funds during financial
market emergencies.
The other main source of taxpayer risk from
the revision of Section 13 (3) is derived from
the accounting principles that would be used in
evaluating the collateral offered for emergency
loans. Nonbanks' previously ineligible assets,
including corporate equity securities and mort-
gages on real estate in the case of securities
firms and institutional investors, tend to be illiq-
uid under the market emergency conditions that
would conceivably give rise to the Board's
authorization of Section 13 (3) loans. In an emer-
gency, whatever market value satisfactory (but
formerly ineligible) assets that nonbanks already
had could undergo severe downward market
pressures, triggering wide gaps between par and
market collateral valuations. Although all dis-
count window advances are expected to be ex-
tended against collateral that is thought to be
both sound and ample, there is reason to be con-
cerned about accurate valuation of nonbanks' as-
sets in periods of intense financial distress.
The expansion of the collateral limits for Re-
serve Banks' extensions of credit under Section
13 (3) might appear to be somewhat at odds
with the principal thrust of the other discount
window provisions of FDICIA, Sections 141 and
142, which, together with the prompt corrective
action provisions, Sections 131-33, were in-
tended to reduce taxpayers' potential risk of
loss due to loans to insured banks. The lending
criteria applicable to undercapitalized depository
institutions were tightened, and more exacting
and publicly accountable procedures for such
lending decisions were established. In Section
141 of FDICIA, provision for a "systemic risk" ex-
ception to normal supervisory intervention and
closing requirements was limited to circumstances
• 21 Comparable perverse incentives for insured depository institu-
tions' behavior are described in the deposit insurance literature. See
Barth and Brumbaugh (1992), pp. 7-12; National Commission (1993),
pp. 62-68; and Kane (1989), pp. 95-114.
in which both two-thirds of the Board and
two-thirds of the FDIC's Board of Directors ap-
proved the exception, with the further concur-
rence of the Secretary of the Treasury, after
consultation with the President.
2
2 The clear
objective of that provision was limiting the tax-
payer's potential exposure to loss through in-
creased procedural hurdles that had to be over-
come to invoke the exception.
IV. Conclusion
The removal of the collateral barriers for Re-
serve Banks' extensions of credit under Section
13 (3) seems to conflict with the spirit of the
other discount window provisions of FDICIA,
Sections 141 and 142. These provisions, along
with the Act's prompt corrective action provi-
sions, Sections 131-133, were intended to less-
en taxpayers' potential exposure to loss
resulting from loans to insured banks.
In contrast, Section 473, by removing the eli-
gible collateral threshold, may have marginally
increased taxpayers' potential risk of loss. This
risk could arise from the moral hazard associated
with the perceived availability of the equivalent
of a federal guarantee for nonbanks. Conse-
quently, increased access to the discount window
by nonbanks carries with it some of the same
kinds of risks that arose during the savings and
loan debacle: Adverse selection and misaligned
agency incentives could increase, together with
the probability of use of the emergency lending
facility and the implicit underwriting of nonbank
losses by taxpayers.
The increased degree of discount window
access for nonbanks was not accompanied by
some of the safeguards normally applicable to
discount window access, such as annual exami-
nations by the federal bank supervisory authori-
ties, maintenance of required reserves and clear-
ing balances at Reserve Banks, and requirements
to meet minimum regulatory capital adequacy
standards. Moreover, by extending a component
of the federal safety net, the Reserve Banks' dis-
count windows, to nonbanks without limitations
on too-big-to-fail rescues, Section 473 of FDICIA
contradicts the spirit of the limitations on the too-
big-to-fail doctrine enacted for depository institu-
tions in FDICIA.
• 22 See Todd (1992a). Systemic risk, as described in Section 141
of FDICIA, is a condition in which the closing of an insured institution,
without redemption of uninsured claims at par, "would have serious ad-
verse effects on economic conditions or financial stability." The connec-
tion between systemic risk for banks and for securities firms is made
strikingly and explicitly in Wall (1993), p. 10.Finally, it is unclear that there was a real (as
opposed to a perceived) need for revision of
Section 13 (3). Section 473 of FDICIA appar-
ently was intended to deal primarily with situ-
ations like the aftermath of the stock market
crash of October 19, 1987, in which securities
firms, mutual funds, and other nonbank hold-
ers of large investment portfolios consisting of
ineligible collateral would have found it help-
ful to obtain credit from Reserve Banks instead
of from banks, insurance companies, invest-
ment banks, and other usual providers of
funds to nonbank financial firms.
Normally, financial markets treat eligible col-
lateral as high-quality instruments that are
close substitutes for cash. Firms holding large,
unpledged amounts of such collateral ordinar-
ily could be expected to be able to obtain suffi-
cient extensions of credit without having
recourse to direct loans from Reserve Banks,
even during market conditions approximating
financial emergencies, as long as financial mar-
kets had adequate supplies of liquidity that the
Federal Reserve could ensure through open-
market operations. In fact, aggressive use of
open-market operations in October 1987 pro-
vided sufficient aggregate liquidity to prevent
the stock market crash from generating sub-
stantive harm to the economy.
The changes effected by Section 473 of
FDICIA should prove quite harmless if the stat-
ute is implemented in a straightforward, risk-
averse manner. However, perverse incentives,
continued observance of a too-big-to-fail doc-
trine (in this case, for nonbanks), and the ab-
sence of adequate procedural safeguards could
increase Reserve Banks' and, ultimately, taxpay-
ers' losses from Section 13 (3) lending activities
in the future. Furthermore, greater potential ac-
cess to the federal financial safety net could
boost the risk-taking incentives for nonbanks,
thereby increasing the probabilities that they
will request discount window lending during
financial emergencies.
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